This study analyzes the factors that influenced hospital expenses and revenues prior to and following the enactment of the New York State Health Care Reform Act of 1996 (HCRA)-the period from 1994-1999. HCRA was expected to encourage price competition which in turn was anticipated to lower hospital revenues and expenses. We measured the differential effects on hospital revenues and expenses in markets with varying degrees of competition. We also measured the relationship between hospital revenues and expenses and the increased concentration resulting from the formation of local hospital systems. We found that revenues and expenses both grew more slowly for hospitals located in more competitive markets; hospital systems that increased concentration tended to have higher revenues. In the short run at least, price competition induced by HCRA did constrain both hospital expense and revenue growth, although the increase in hospital mergers countered this trend.
Since the 1970s, policymakers have been concerned with growing health care costs. Between 1970 and 1995, the share of health expenditures in the gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 7.1% to 13.6% (Levit et al. 1996) . To control these continuously rising costs, states initially experimented with varying degrees of hospital rate regulation. Four states-New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Maryland-enacted the most restrictive regulation, with the states setting hospitals' rates. Studies conducted in the 1980s consistently showed that regulation was successful in controlling hospital cost increases and had controlled hospital costs to approximately the same extent as the use of competitive forces (see for example Robinson and Luft 1988) . During the 1990s, however, competition had become substantially more effective than regulation in controlling hospital cost increases (Friedman and Coffey 1993; Melnick and Zwanziger 1995) . By 1996, only New York and Maryland retained programs to regulate hospital rates.
New York had been one of the earliest states to introduce hospital rate regulation. In 1983, it enacted the New York Prospective Hospital Reimbursement Methodology (NYPHRM) to accomplish several public policy goals. NYPHRM provided a standardized procedure for calculating hospital rates. In 1996, New York legislators dramatically changed course by en-acting the New York Health Care Reform Act of 1996 (HCRA), which abandoned hospital rate regulation. Hospitals now had to compete on the basis of price for patients with private insurance.
Supporters of HCRA had both theoretical and empirical grounds for expecting price competition to lower hospital prices. In theory, HCRA changed the economic incentives faced by both insurers and hospitals. Insurance plans now would have the ability to negotiate lower prices with hospitals; employers, expecting plans to use this ability, would press for lower health insurance premiums. Given this price sensitivity, insurance plans, in turn, would have to lower their payments to providers (by far their largest expense category).
Selective contracting is a primary means by which insurance plans can use their market power to accomplish this goal. It works as follows:
1. The plan incorporates features, typically a lower copayment rate, that substantially lowers out-of-pocket cost to beneficiaries if they use a hospital in the plan's provider network; and 2. The plan requires a contractual agreement that includes price reductions for hospitals to receive this network designation.
Plans with such features are called managed care organizations (MCOs) since they have much greater control over the choice of provider and the services received by beneficiaries. The empirical evidence cited by supporters of HCRA focused on states, such as California, that had first enacted legislation to encourage the growth of MCOs as a means of inducing price competition. Studies have shown that in the period subsequent to this change, payments to California hospitals did grow at a far lower rate than payments did nationally (Melnick and Zwanziger 1995) , and these reductions were highest in hospital markets with high levels of competition (Zwanziger, Melnick, and Bamezai 2000) . As theory would predict, hospitals protected their profitability by reducing cost growth as well, with rates of cost growth falling roughly parallel with revenues (Zwanziger and Melnick 1988; Robinson 1991; Zwanziger et al. 1994b; Melnick and Zwanziger 1995; Zwanziger, Melnick, and Bamezai 2000) . Two studies also suggest that selective contracting had similar effects at a national level during the 1990s following rapid MCO growth (Bamezai et al. 1999; Gaskin and Hadley 1997) .
The analytical strategy for this paper is based on the belief that the selective contracting unleashed by HCRA was expected to have a differential effect on hospitals, and that this effect would depend systematically on the competitiveness of a hospital's market. We use this differential response to identify the HCRA effect. At one extreme, hospitals in highly concentrated markets actually had greater pricing power after the enactment of HCRA than they had under NYPHRM. As a result, one would expect their prices and revenues to rise; costs would be expected to rise as well with this reduction in financial constraints. On the other hand, hospitals in competitive markets-those with many alternative hospitals-would be expected to agree to contracts with lower prices as MCOs used the presence of these alternatives to threaten to exclude a hospital from its network. As prices erode, hospitals face falling revenue and reduce costs to maintain financial stability. As a market becomes more competitive, the threat to exclude a hospital from a plan's provider network becomes more credible and selective contracting should be more effective in lowering hospital prices. Thus, the advent of HCRA would be expected to affect hospitals in highly competitive markets far more than those located in relatively concentrated ones. In general, we would expect each hospital's response to HCRA to be correlated to the competitiveness of its market and to use this relationship to estimate the effect of price deregulation.
Of course, hospitals also can be expected to find longer-term, and from their perspective more attractive, responses to the increase in competitive pressures following HCRA. One response would be to reduce this competitiveness by merging with hospitals in their market. In fact, the number of hospitals in hospital systems grew rapidly in New York after 1996. Such mergers could have at least two potential objectives: 1) to increase efficiency by consolidating into larger operating entities, and 2) to increase their market shares, and thus their bargaining power. Since the latter effect could decrease the competitiveness of hospital markets, we incorporate the effects of hospital systems in analyzing the factors influencing hospital revenues and expenses.
HCRA became effective on Jan. 1, 1997, and was reauthorized with relatively minor changes in 1999. New York's enactment of HCRA provides an opportunity to test whether the relationship between hospital revenues and expenses and price competition induced by selective contracting can be observed following a stark change in policy: moving directly from price regulation to price competition. Salit, Fass, and Nowak (2002) provide an initial description of the deterioration of the financial health of many New York City hospitals in the late 1990s. They attribute the observed changes to HCRA, the federal Balanced Budget Act of 1996 that reduced payment rates for Medicare and Medicaid, and the growth of managed care in 1997 and subsequent years. Their descriptive approach leaves one unable to assess the degree to which these factors were associated with the observed reduction in hospital profit margins and increase in financial distress. This paper uses multivariate regression modeling to evaluate the changes in the relationship between the characteristics of a hospital's market and the hospital's revenues and expenses following the enactment of HCRA.
Data and Methods

Specification of the Expense and Revenue Models
We have drawn upon an extensive literature in specifying the expense and revenue models. Empirical studies of hospital expenses tend to adopt one of two approaches in specifying the model to be estimated (Breyer 1987) . One approach is ad hoc, with variables that are expected to affect hospital expenses based upon knowledge of the industry. The other approach stems from basic economic theory and uses flexible functional forms derived from the analysis of neoclassical production theory (McFadden 1978) . Since the model is intended to study the effects of changes in policy and market environments on hospital expenses and revenues, the model we estimated drew from both approaches: it incorporates hospital outputs and input prices-as suggested by economic theoryas well as measures that characterize a hospital and its competitive environment over time. Both the revenue and expense models are specified similarly since hospital revenue and expenses are highly correlated. Both models have the following form:
where i is the hospital, t is the year, E is total hospital expenses (or revenues), O is a vector of hospital output variables (e.g., inpatient discharges, outpatient visits, case mix), P is the input price index, Z is a vector of variables that change over time (e.g., proportion of discharges paid for by Medicare), M is a vector of hospital and MCO market characteristics, T is a vector of time dummies, T 3 M is a vector of interactions between time and market variables, h i is a hospital-specific error term, and e it is the residual error that is identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) (0,s 2 ).
We used a hospital fixed-effects model to account for all the unmeasured hospital-specific factors. As a result, all time invariant hospitalspecific variables, such as urban or rural location, were absorbed in the coefficient of the hospital indicator and do not appear in the previous specification. Coefficients were estimated for variables that change over time (for at least a subset of hospitals and years). The value of these coefficients reflect the average relationship between changes over time in the dependent variable and each such independent variable. The coefficients of variables interacted with the year indicator variables represent a very different relationship. Since the year indicator variable is equal to 1 for one year and 0 for all other years, the coefficients of these variables capture the relationship between cross-sectional variation in the interacted variable and the dependent variable in a specific year. In particular, the effects of HCRA were captured by the coefficients of the interaction between the measure of the competitiveness of the hospital's market and year. The values of these coefficients subsequent to the enactment of HCRA trace the adjustment hospitals made in response.
Data Sources
We used data from a variety of sources, but primarily from the New York State Department of Health and Department of Insurance (DOI). The New York state government requires hospitals to complete the Institutional Cost Reports (ICR) each year. The ICR contain detailed cost, revenue, and utilization data, which provide an extraordinarily rich source of hospital data. We analyzed ICR data for 1994-1999 in this study, extracting variables that measure hospitals' revenues, expenses, and utilization. We also used the Statewide Planning and Cooperative System (SPARCS) data, which include records for all hospital discharges in New York. These data were used to calculate each hospital's case-mix index (using the New York state all-payer diagnosis-related group [DRG] weights) and to derive a measure of the competitiveness of each hospital's market. The Healthcare Association of New York State (HANYS) provided us with the membership in hospital systems over the 1994-1999 period. Data on common ownership came from a variety of sources including the American Hospital Association's Annual Survey of Hospitals, HANYS surveys, and direct contacts. We obtained changes in prices of hospital inputs from price index data published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and HANYS. We calculated health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration using the enrollment data in each county where an HMO operated; all HMOs operating in New York are required to file these data annually with DOI. County populations were taken from the 1990 census. Depending on the year, between 86% and 90% of the general, acute care hospitals in New York provided all the data needed for the analysis.
Construction of the Dependent Variable and Covariates
Dependent variables. Total patient care expenses and revenue were taken directly from the ICR data. These dependent variables were not deflated because we did not want to restrict the response of hospitals to increasing input prices to be exactly proportional to inflation. Instead, we included an input price index as a covariate to control for inflation.
Output measures. We used four output measures for each hospital and year-the number of inpatient admissions, outpatient visits, outpatient surgeries, and their DRG case-mix index. The former three measures were all extracted from the ICR data, the latter from the SPARCS data. The index was estimated using the New York state all-payer DRG weights for each year.
Input price variables. We used the Medicare area wage index to control for the relative cost of labor in each hospital's geographic area. (Changes in the statewide average wage levels from one year to the next are captured by the coefficients of the year indicator variables.)
Market competition. We also used SPARCS data from 1994-1999 to calculate the intensity of competition for each hospital. The measure used was the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI), a measure of competition developed by economists to incorporate both the number of competitors and their relative size in a single measure. The SPARCS data set for a year consists of records for all discharges from all hospitals in New York state in the year. The five-digit zip code area in which a patient resided was the geographic unit in our analysis. It is the smallest geographic unit that can be identified in the SPARCS data and provides the best estimate of the alternatives available to the beneficiaries living in a given area.
Using each zip code area as a geographic unit, we found the proportion of patients in the zip code area going to each hospital, and summed the squares of these proportions to calculate the zip code's HHI. We then calculated the relative proportion of a hospital's patients coming from each zip code. These proportions were used to calculate a weighted average HHI as the measure of the competitiveness of the hospital's market. The specific algorithms used are described in detail in Zwanziger, Melnick, and Mann (1990) and Zwanziger and Melnick (1988) . The HHIs calculated in this manner assume that hospitals are all independent.
Competitive effects of local hospital systems. We modified the approach to calculate a hospital's HHI to incorporate its membership in local hospital systems. The market shares we used in the calculation of the system HHI for the zip code were the sums of the market shares of each system's members in the zip code area.
2 Having calculated each zip code's new system HHI, we then recalculated the hospital's HHI as the weighted average of the system-based HHIs for all of the zip code areas in the hospital's market using the same weights as before. The greater the overlapping of markets among system member hospitals in a zip code area, the greater will be increases in the HHI of a member hospital from combining all system discharges in the zip code. (In the extreme, if no system hospitals were to have any overlap in their market areas with any other member hospital there would be no increase in the HHIs.) Finally, we calculated the ratio of each hospital's ''freestanding'' HHI and its ''system'' HHI to measure the proportionate increase in concentration caused by the local hospital systems.
HMO penetration. We used the data filed with the departments of health and insurance to calculate total HMO enrollment in each county. HMO penetration was found by dividing total HMO enrollment by the population of the county. For each hospital, its HMO penetration was the average penetration in the counties of its market, with the average weighted by the number of admissions from each county.
Since expenses, revenues, and output variables were highly skewed, the logarithmic transform of each was chosen as the appropriate variable for the multivariate regression model. The log function was used for all continuous variables in the models so that the estimated coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. Thus, the coefficient for a given independent variable is the percentage change in the dependent variable (hospital expenses or revenue) associated with a 1% change in that independent variable.
Results
The hospital industry in New York consolidated rapidly following the enactment of HCRA (Table  1) . By 1998, a majority of New York hospitals for which we had complete data were parts of hospital systems. Hospitals in systems tend to be larger than those that remain freestanding, so between 1994 and 1999 there was an almost perfect reversal between the proportion of beds accounted for by system and nonsystem hospitals (approximately 60% of beds were in system hospitals). Table 2 presents the mean percentage change in hospital revenue and expenses for the cohort of hospitals with revenue and expenses over the entire 1994-1999 period. The data reveal a clear pattern. All hospitals had similar average rates of increase in both hospital revenue and expenses prior to HCRA, whereas hospitals in more competitive markets-those in markets with HHIs lower than the median value-had lower rates of increase afterward. In both cases, the rates of increase were more similar in 1999, but the reason differs for revenue and expenses. The percentage increase in hospital revenue trended downward in less competitive markets from 1997 on, suggesting that HCRA had a gradual effect in these areas as well, although they never experienced the dramatic reduction seen in competitive areas, such as the absolute reduction in average revenue in 1997. Hospital expenses appear to have been harder to reduce. There was a rebound from the depressed levels seen in competitive areas in 1997 and 1998, suggesting some diminution of the effects of the HCRA. Since expenses increased more rapidly than revenue, hospital profit margins have fallen since 1997. The means and standard deviations of the variables in the regression model are presented in Table 3 . The multivariate regression estimates for hospital expenses are presented in Table 4 . All the output measures (admissions, visits, ambulatory surgery procedures, and case-mix index) had positive and-with the exception of ambulatory surgery-statistically significant elasticities. The relative magnitudes of these coefficients were consistent with the share of hospital expenses for which they accounted. Changes in relative wage index were insignificantly related to changes in expenses.
Changes in the number of beds-largely reductions during the study period-were associated with a positive and significant effect on expenses. An increase in the proportion of Medicaid patients was significantly associated with increases in expenses, but changes in the corresponding proportion of Medicare patients were statistically insignificant.
The three policy variables-the HHI, the increase in the HHI due to local hospital systems, and HMO penetration-all had statistically insignificant main effect coefficients. The interaction of HMO penetration and the two measures of the competitiveness of the hospital market also were statistically insignificant. The interaction of HMO penetration with the system HHI, however, was almost significant, and its negative sign would suggest that increases in HMO penetration were associated with lower hospital expenses even when system HHIs were increasing. The coefficients of the HHI interacted with the year indicator variables were positive, steadily increasing in magnitude until they became statistically significant (at the 5% level) in 1997, 1998, and 1999 .
The estimated regression model for revenue (Table 5 ) exhibits a similar pattern of coefficients with a few intriguing differences. The similarities were expected given the very high correlation between expenses and revenues, making the differences that occurred even more striking. There were a few ''main effect'' coefficients that differed substantially between the two regression models. These coefficients display the relationship between changes over time in the independent variable and the dependent variables. An increase in the number of ambulatory surgeries had a statistically significant (and positive) effect on revenue. An increase in the proportion of Medicaid patients was not significantly associated with increased revenue, but was significantly related to an increase in expenses. Increases in the concentration of the hospital market, either through changes in market shares or from hospital system formations, were significantly associated with decreased revenue. Changes in HMO penetration did not affect revenue, but changes in its interaction with the system HHI lowered revenue to a statistically significant degree. The year interactions show a similar pattern of similarities and differences to the corresponding coefficients in the expense model. In both models, the coefficients of HHI were increasingly positive and became statistically significant from 1996 on. The coefficients of the year-system HHI interaction variables were positive and statistically significant in 1997, 1998, and 1999.
Discussion and Policy Implications
When interpreting these results, it is important to remember that the multivariate regression models were estimated with hospital fixed effects. The coefficient of each main effect variable reflects the relationship between changes over time in the dependent variable and that variable over the study period. The coefficients of variables interacted with year indicator variables capture the relationship between cross-sectional variation in the interacted variable and the dependent variable in that year. Given our interest in the structural changes associated with the enactment of HCRA in 1996, we focus our discussion on the time interactions with the policy variables since these coefficients reveal how these cross-sectional relationships changed with the enactment of HCRA. Hospital revenues had the expected negative relationship with hospital market concentration. There was a monotonic increase in the coefficients of the HHI interacted with the year indicator variables. These coefficients became large and significant following enactment of HCRA. These results suggest that a structural change took place that resulted in a differential effect: lower hospital revenue became associated with more competitive hospital markets with the enactment of HCRA. The corresponding coefficients in the expense model show substantially the same pattern and similar elasticities (although the increase in the size of the coefficients over time was smaller, suggesting that hospitals in more competitive markets were able to lower their expenses to a lesser degree than the reduction in revenue they experienced).
Increases in hospital concentration resulting from system formation did not have the same relationship to revenues and expenses. There was essentially no relationship over time between system-related increases in the HHI and expenses. The interactions of year indicators and increases in concentration stemming from hospital system formation did not show any significant relationship with expenses. It appears that-at least in the short run-hospital systems generally have been unable to increase their operating efficiency after a merger. The effects of this variable on revenues were more complex. Markets where concentrations have increased over time due to system growth did tend to have lower increases in revenues. At the same time, there was a rapidly growing cross-sectional gradient in the relationship between revenue and system-induced HHI. These results suggest a complex interplay between competitive strategies emphasizing market share-which would tend to keep prices lowand the exploitation of an increase in market power-which would tend to raise prices.
One clearly must be wary of generalizing data that are limited to one state and cover a period of six years. In this case though, the results are so similar to those observed by researchers in other states and nationally that it suggests a very similar response is at work.
It is also important to review the chain of reasoning supporting the claim that the observed changes are ''HCRA effects.'' Causality is notoriously difficult to prove in the social sciences and this study is no exception. The regression analyses show associations; they do not prove a causal relationship. That difficulty granted, the results are highly suggestive of the hypothesized direct relationship. The fact that the observed changes between HHI and both revenue and expenses were clustered in the 1996-1997 period, when HCRA was enacted, suggests a relationship. In particular, the fact that the HHI, a measure of the competitiveness of the hospital market, became increasingly positively related to hospital revenue suggests that it is the nature of hospital competition that was changing during this period.
The most serious limitation in the study is that we have a relatively short period in which to observe hospitals' responses to dramatic and complex changes both in policy and in the overall operating environment. It is clear that the data show a pattern of adjustment, and it is unlikely that an equilibrium had been reached by 1999, the last year of our data. It would be important to continue to assess the impacts of system formation over a more extended period of time.
This study documents some of the dramatic changes that occur in hospital behavior once selective contracting becomes an important influence on the demand for hospital services. The results confirm those of other studies showing the immediate effects of selective contracting: hospitals' revenues were constrained by competitive pressures on prices and hospitals modified their operations in light of these expectations. The rate of growth in hospital revenue decreased after the enactment of HCRA; this effect was particularly dramatic for hospitals in more competitive markets. In that sense, HCRA succeeded. It harnessed competitive forces to control payments to hospitals.
The very strength of the pressure that hospitals anticipated may have served to limit the effectiveness of this market-oriented policy. In the short run, hospitals saw their profit margins fall as expense growth outstripped revenue growth; but it also appears that the enactment of HCRA induced many hospitals to merge. After 1996, there was a rapid acceleration in the formation of hospital systems and a concomitant decrease in the competitiveness of hospital markets. The results of this study provide a preliminary indication that the increase in hospital concentration also may affect hospital prices. These results reinforce the need to monitor hospital system formation and its effects on the competitive functioning of hospital markets.
Notes
1 The following formula summarizes the calculation:
where HHI i is the HHI for the i th hospital, w ij is the proportion of discharges from zip-code area (ZCA) j that go to hospital i, and HHI j is the HHI for the j th ZCA.
2 Implicit in this approach is the assumption that each system uses the market power created by its total market share in an area in negotiating with an MCO.
